Toward a Modest Correspondence Theory of Truth: Predicates and Properties

Dialogue 47 (1):81- (2008)
Correspondence theories are frequently charged with being either implausible -- metaphysically troubling and overly general -- or trivial -- collapsing into deflationism's "'P' is true iff P." Philip Kitcher argues for a "modest" correspondence theory, on which reference relations are causal relations, but there is no general theory of denotation. In this paper, I start by showing that, understood this way, "modest" theories are open to charges of triviality. I then offer a refinement of modesty, and take the first steps toward articulating a modest correspondence theory, giving a particular account of the relation between predicates, properties, and extensions. Finally, I argue that my account does not collapse into a deflationary one.
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DOI 10.1017/S0012217300002390
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Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.

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