The Eleatic and the Indispensabilist

Abstract

The debate over whether we should believe that mathematical objects exist quickly leads to the question of how to determine what we should believe. Indispensabilists claim that we should believe in the existence of mathematical objects because of their ineliminable roles in scientific theory. Eleatics argue that only objects with causal properties exist. Mark Colyvan’s recent defenses of Quine’s indispensability argument against some contemporary eleatics attempt to provide reasons to favor the indispensabilist’s criterion. I show that Colyvan’s argument is not decisive against the eleatic and sketch a way to capture the important intuitions behind both views.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,227

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Mathematical Contingentism.Kristie Miller - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (3):335-359.
Numbers without Science.Russell Marcus - 2007 - Dissertation, The Graduate School and University Center of the City University of New York
On What Is Not There. Quine, Meinong, and the Indispensability Argument.Majid Davoody Beni - 2013 - Humana.Mente - Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (25):77-94.
Pythagorean powers or a challenge to platonism.Colin Cheyne & Charles R. Pigden - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):639 – 645.
merricks, Causation, And Objects.Steven Halady - 2009 - Florida Philosophical Review 9 (1):14-28.
Indispensability arguments and instrumental nominalism.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):687-709.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-06-11

Downloads
69 (#238,041)

6 months
16 (#160,768)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Russell Marcus
Hamilton College

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references