Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (September):121-129 (1973)

Abstract
A main thrust of much of Quine's work is that meaning, belief, desire, motive and other so-called “intentional phenomena” are under-determined by all possible evidence: the totality of possible evidence could not determine whether two persons meant, believed, desired, or had as motives the same thing. One way to identify a person's beliefs, desires and motives is to frame a theory of his meanings, for then we could ask him what he believed and desired; this will be a theory of translation for his language. But such a theory of meaning, according to Quine, is also not uniquely determined by all the evidence. ThusTo accept intentional usage at face value is … to postulate translation relations as somehow objectively valid though indeterminate in principle relative to the totality of speech dispositions… Such postulation promises little gain in scientific insight …
Keywords Intentionality  Language  Mental Act  Observation  Speech Act  Quine
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.1973.10716075
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Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
Psychological Explanation. [REVIEW]T. C. Chabdack - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (1):95-97.
A Query on Radical Translation.John Wallace - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (6):143-151.

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