Authors
Lou Marinoff
City College of New York (CUNY)
Abstract
Hamilton games-theoretic conflict model, which applies Maynard Smith's concept of evolutionarily stable strategy to the Prisoner's Dilemma, gives rise to an inconsistency between theoretical prescription and empirical results. Proposed resolutions of thisproblem are incongruent with the tenets of the models involved. The independent consistency of each model is restored, and the anomaly thereby circumvented, by a proof that no evolutionarily stable strategy exists in the Prisoner's Dilemma.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/41.4.461
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References found in this work BETA

Sociobiology: The New Synthesis.Edward O. Wilson - 1975 - Journal of the History of Biology 33 (3):577-584.

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Hobbes, Spinoza, Kant, Highway Robbery and Game Theory.Louis Marinoff - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):445 – 462.

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