Abstract

The author contrasts the Kantian concept of Verstand/Verstehen with Dilthey's conception of Verstehen as opposite to Verstand. Three issues are presupposed: 1) The link with which Dilthey binds Verstand to Verstehen essentially "matches" Kant's connection between Verstand and Urteil 2) But Kant's critique also sets the reciprocal bounds that Verstand, morality and aesthetical and teleological thinking must keep within, whereas Dilthey puts forth a structural and positive theory of reason, grounded in temporality and in the principle of the reciprocal inclusion of all the elements of reason in the actual life of reason itself; 3) Both Kant and Dilthey recognize Verstehen as a cognitive factor, but Dilthey traces the way for Heidegger's interpretation of Verstehen as one of Dasein's ontological structures. These items provide the framework for the analysis of Dilthey's theory of Verstehen as a cognitive factor, whose limits are rooted in "life itself". Dilthey's theory is threefold: a) Scientific and positive b) Critical and genetical c) Ontological . The paper concludes with a scheme of the relation between research and experience in Dilthey