Authors
Colin Marshall
University of Washington
Abstract
I argue that, contrary to how he is often read, Spinoza did not believe that the mind and the body were numerically identical. This means that we must find some alternative reading for his claims that they are 'one and the same thing'
Keywords Spinoza  'one and the same'  mind  body  causation  attribute
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DOI 10.1080/09608780903135030
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References found in this work BETA

Spinoza.Don Garrett & R. J. Delahunty - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (4):610.
Substance, Attribute, and Mode in Spinoza.Martin Lin - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):144–153.

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Citations of this work BETA

Spinoza on Destroying Passions with Reason.Colin Marshall - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):139-160.
Spinoza, Gueroult, and Substance.A. D. Smith - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):655-688.
Spinoza on the Limits of Explanation.Karolina Hübner - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

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