Erkenntnis 79 (5):1015-1026 (2014)

Abstract
The problem of artificial precision is a major objection to any theory of vagueness based on real numbers as degrees of truth. Suppose you are willing to admit that, under sufficiently specified circumstances, a predication of “is red” receives a unique, exact number from the real unit interval [0, 1]. You should then be committed to explain what is it that determines that value, settling for instance that my coat is red to degree 0.322 rather than 0.321. In this note I revisit the problem in the important case of Łukasiewicz infinite-valued propositional logic that brings to the foreground the rôle of maximally consistent theories. I argue that the problem of artificial precision, as commonly conceived of in the literature, actually conflates two distinct problems of a very different nature
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9587-4
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References found in this work BETA

Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - London and New York: Routledge.
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics.Alfred Tarski - 1956 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Theories of Vagueness.Rosanna Keefe - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
Vagueness and Degrees of Truth.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2008 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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