What is the Epistemic Significance of Disagreement?


Authors
Noah Gabriel Martin
University of Brighton
Abstract
Over the past decade, attention to epistemically significant disagreement has centered on the question of whose disagreement qualifies as significant, but ignored another fundamental question: what is the epistemic significance of disagreement? While epistemologists have assumed that disagreement is only significant when it indicates a determinate likelihood that one’s own belief is false, and therefore that only disagreements with epistemic peers are significant at all, they have ignored a more subtle and more basic significance that belongs to all disagreements, regardless of who they are with—that the opposing party is wrong. It is important to recognize the basic significance of disagreement since it is what explains all manners of rational responses to disagreement, including assessing possible epistemic peers and arguing against opponents regardless of their epistemic fitness.
Keywords social epistemology  disagreement  epistemic peers
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme201910326
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.
The Epistemology of Disagreement.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Unconfirmed Peers and Spinelessness.Ben Sherman - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):425-444.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Possible Disagreements and Defeat.Brandon Carey - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):371-381.
Disagreement and Epistemic Peers.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Oxford Handbooks Online.
Disagreement: Idealized and Everyday.Jonathan Matheson - 2014 - In Jonathan Matheson Rico Vitz (ed.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. Oxford University Press. pp. 315-330.
A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - In Alan Millar Adrian Haddock & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 145-154.
Desacuerdos Entre Pares Epistémicos. El Número Importa.Nicolás Francisco Lo Guercio - 2016 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 20 (3):325-341.
Distant Peers.Mark Vorobej - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (5):708-722.
How to Solve the Puzzle of Peer Disagreement.Michele Palmira - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):83-96.
Who is an Epistemic Peer?Axel Gelfert - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (4):507-514.
The Epistemic Significance of Political Disagreement.Bjørn Hallsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2187-2202.
A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:145-154.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-10-07

Total views
70 ( #129,112 of 2,309,732 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
45 ( #16,547 of 2,309,732 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature