Journal of Philosophical Research 34:215-241 (2009)
The thesis that mental states are physical states enjoys widespread popularity. After the abandonment of typeidentity theories, however, this thesis has typically been framed in terms of state tokens. I argue that token states are a philosopher’s fiction, and that debates about the identity of mental and physical state tokens thus rest on a mistake
|Keywords||Contemporary Philosophy General Interest|
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