Abstract
Philosophers writing on moral responsibility inherit from P.F. Strawson a particular problem space. On one side, it is shaped by consequentialist accounts of moral criticism on which blame is justified, if at all, by its efficacy in influencing future behavior in socially desirable ways. It is by now a common criticism of such views that they suffer a "wrong kind of reason" problem. When blame is warranted in the proper way, it is natural to suppose this is because the target deserves blame – thus opposing to consequentialist views of blame desert-based views. The latter, however, raise worries that blame is a form of retributive sanction whose justificatory burdens cannot be met. I evaluate T.M. Scanlon's recent attempt to maneuver this space. In doing so, I argue that although Scanlon’s relationship-impairment model of blame has clear advantages over consequentialist and desert-based alternatives, it fails: (1) to adequately appreciate the significance of person-focused emotional attitudes in constituting persons as agents subject to a nexus of normative expectations and demands, and (2) to recognize that a victim may owe nearly nothing *to* a blameworthy agent while nonetheless retaining unconditional moral obligations to act in certain ways (and forego acting in other ways) toward him.
Keywords blame  Scanlon
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00518.x
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Free Will, Praise and Blame.J. J. C. Smart - 1961 - Mind 70 (279):291-306.

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Citations of this work BETA

Properly Proleptic Blame.Benjamin Bagley - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):852-882.
The Nature and Ethics of Blame.D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (3):197-207.
Reactivity and Refuge.Michelle Mason - 2014 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Vol. 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 143-162.

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Similar books and articles

The Nature and Ethics of Blame.D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (3):197-207.
Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame.Thomas Scanlon - 2008 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest.Matthew Talbert - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (1):89-109.
Scanlon on Double Effect. [REVIEW]Ralph Wedgwood - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):464-472.
Partial Desert.Tamler Sommers - forthcoming - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
The Force and Fairness of Blame.Pamela Hieronymi - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):115–148.
Praise and Blame.Garrath Williams - 2004 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
In Praise of Blame.Barbara Houston - 1992 - Hypatia 7 (4):128 - 147.

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