Demystifying without quining: Wittgenstein and Dennett on qualitative states

In his 1991 book ‘Consciousness Explained', Daniel Dennett presents his “Multiple Drafts” model of consciousness. Central to his theory is the rejection of the notion of ‘qualia'; of the existence of the purported ‘qualitative character' of conscious experience that many argue rules out the possibility of a purely materialist theory of mind. In eliminating qualia from his theory of consciousness, Dennett claims to be following in the footsteps of Wittgenstein, who also had much to say regarding the nature of ‘private' experience. In this paper I reject this claim and argue that the elimination of qualia plays no part in Wittgenstein's radical understanding of conscious experience. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.24(1) 2005: 33-43
Keywords Consciousness  Metaphysics  Qualia  Dennett, D  Wittgenstein
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DOI 10.4314/sajpem.v24i1.31412
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