Galileo's mathematization of nature at the crossroad between the empiricist and the Kantian tradition

Perspectives on Science 18 (2):pp. 152-188 (2010)
The aim of this paper is to take Galileo's mathematization of nature as a springboard for contrasting the time-honoured empiricist conception of phenomena, exemplified by Pierre Duhem's analysis in To Save the Phenomena , with Immanuel Kant's. Hence the purpose of this paper is twofold. I) On the philosophical side, I want to draw attention to Kant's more robust conception of phenomena compared to the one we have inherited from Duhem and contemporary empiricism. II) On the historical side, I want to show what particular aspects of Galileo's mathematization of nature find a counterpart in Kant's conception of phenomena.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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DOI 10.1162/posc.2010.18.2.152
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References found in this work BETA
Structure: Its Shadow and Substance.C. van Fraassen Bas - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):275-307.
Galileo and the Problem of Free Fall.R. H. Naylor - 1974 - British Journal for the History of Science 7 (2):105-134.

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Citations of this work BETA
‘Working in a New World’: Kuhn, Constructivism, and Mind-Dependence.Michela Massimi - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 50:83-89.

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