Intentions, motives and the doctrine of double effect
Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):567-585 (2010)
Abstract
I defend the doctrine of double effect and a so-called ‘strict’ definition of intention: A intends an effect if and only if A has it as an end or believes that it is a state of affairs in the causal sequence that will result in A's end. Following Kamm's proposed ‘doctrine of triple effect’, I distinguish an intended effect from an effect that motivates an action, and show that this distinction is morally significant. I use several contrived cases as illustrations, but my position does not depend on intuitive judgements about them. Instead, it follows from the view that the moral permissibility of an action depends at least partly on how it forms the agent's character. I also respond to some objections presented by Harris, Bennett, McIntyre, Thomson and Scanlon to the doctrine of double effectAuthor's Profile
DOI
10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.633.x
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2009-06-04
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Citations of this work
So Close, Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short.Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):376-409.
The Doctrine of Double Effect: Intention and Permissibility.William J. FitzPatrick - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (3):183-196.
A Question-Sensitive Theory of Intention.Bob Beddor & Simon Goldstein - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly:1-39.
The last low whispers of our dead: when is it ethically justifiable to render a patient unconscious until death?Daniel Sulmasy - 2018 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 39 (3):233-263.