Intentions, motives and the doctrine of double effect

Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):567-585 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I defend the doctrine of double effect and a so-called ‘strict’ definition of intention: A intends an effect if and only if A has it as an end or believes that it is a state of affairs in the causal sequence that will result in A's end. Following Kamm's proposed ‘doctrine of triple effect’, I distinguish an intended effect from an effect that motivates an action, and show that this distinction is morally significant. I use several contrived cases as illustrations, but my position does not depend on intuitive judgements about them. Instead, it follows from the view that the moral permissibility of an action depends at least partly on how it forms the agent's character. I also respond to some objections presented by Harris, Bennett, McIntyre, Thomson and Scanlon to the doctrine of double effect

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,479

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Revising the Doctrine of Double Effect.Jeff McMahan - 1994 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 11 (2):201-212.
Scanlon on Double Effect. [REVIEW]Ralph Wedgwood - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):464-472.
Four versions of double effect.Donald B. Marquis - 1991 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16 (5):515-544.
Intention and responsibility in double effect cases.David K. Chan - 2000 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (4):405-434.
Who is entitled to double effect?Joseph Boyle - 1991 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16 (5):475-494.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-06-04

Downloads
266 (#46,202)

6 months
7 (#118,276)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Lawrence Masek
Ohio Dominican University

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references