On The Verge Of Being And Time: Before Heidegger’s Dismissal Of Bergson

Philosophy Today 54 (2):138-52 (2010)

Abstract

Heidegger claims in Being and Time that Bergson fails to overcome traditional ontology because his concept of time is fundamentally Aristotelian. On the basis of this hasty dismissal, it is tempting to conclude that Heidegger was not terribly interested in Bergson or that he only wanted to prevent readers from confusing his view of time with Bergson’s. To the contrary, a survey of Heidegger’s early lectures and writings on the issue of time reveals a strong interest in Bergson and an acknowledgement of his importance as a pivotal thinker concerning time. In fact, Heidegger appropriates key aspects of Bergsonism, such as Bergson’s way of contrasting the measurement of time and its experiential origins, revealing that his ambivalence toward Bergson initially arises from concerns about his method and his concept of life rather than his understanding of time.

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Heath Massey
Beloit College

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Inheritance, Originality and the Will: Bergson and Heidegger on Creation.Mark Sinclair - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (5):655-675.

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