Synthese:1-27 (forthcoming)

Authors
Michela Massimi
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
This paper attends to two main tasks. First, I introduce the notion of perspectival disagreement in science. Second, I relate perspectival disagreement in science to the broader issue of realism about science: how to maintain realist ontological commitments in the face of perspectival disagreement among scientists? I argue that often enough perspectival disagreement is not at the level of the scientific knowledge claims but rather of the methodological and justificatory principles. I introduce and clarify the notion of ‘agreeing-whilst-perspectivally-disagreeing’ with an episode from the history of modern physics: namely, how we came to agree about the electric charge as a minimal natural unit despite different scientific perspectives and associated data-to-phenomena inferences available for it in the period 1897–1906.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-019-02500-6
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,437
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Eternalism and Perspectival Realism About the ‘Now’.Matias Slavov - 2020 - Foundations of Physics 50 (11):1398-1410.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Four Kinds of Perspectival Truth.Michela Massimi - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):342-359.
Disagreement in Scientific Ontologies.David Ludwig - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie (1):1-13.
How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?David Enoch - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.
The Paradox of Scientific Expertise: A Perspectivist Approach to Knowledge Asymmetries.Hugo Fjelsted Alrøe & Egon Noe - 2011 - Fachsprache - International Journal of Specialized Communication (3–4):152-167.
Disagreement, Perspectivism, Consequentialism.Arnold Burms - 2009 - Ethical Perspectives 16 (2):155-163.
Perspectival Modeling.Michela Massimi - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (3):335-359.
Referential and Perspectival Realism.Paul Teller - 2018 - Spontaneous Generations 9 (1):151-164.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-01-03

Total views
17 ( #594,993 of 2,420,957 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #192,292 of 2,420,957 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes