Space Perception, Visual Dissonance and the Fate of Standard Representationalism

Noûs 51 (3):565-593 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper argues that a common form of representationalism has trouble accommodating empirical findings about visual space perception. Vision science tells us that the visual system systematically gives rise to different experiences of the same spatial property. This, combined with a naturalistic account of content, suggests that the same spatial property can have different veridical looks. I use this to argue that a common form of representationalism about spatial experience must be rejected. I conclude by considering alternatives to this view

Similar books and articles

Visual Prominence and Representationalism.Todd Ganson & Ben Bronner - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):405-418.
Strong representationalism and centered content.Berit Brogaard - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):373 - 392.
The Spatial Content of Experience.Brad Thompson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.
Seeing it all clearly: The real story on blurry vision.Robert Schroer - 2002 - American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (3):297-301.
Space and Self-Awareness.John Louis Schwenkler - 2009 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
Color constancy and Russellian representationalism.Brad Thompson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):75-94.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-11-05

Downloads
1,118 (#7,810)

6 months
100 (#14,682)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Farid Masrour
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Citations of this work

The contents of perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Perceptual illusionism.Brian Cutter - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (4):396-417.
What the Senses Cannot ‘Say’.Jonathan Brink Morgan - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):557-579.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Sense and Sensibilia.John Langshaw Austin - 1962 - Oxford University Press.
The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.

View all 72 references / Add more references