Noûs 51 (3):565-593 (2017)
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Abstract |
This paper argues that a common form of representationalism has trouble accommodating empirical findings about visual space perception. Vision science tells us that the visual system systematically gives rise to different experiences of the same spatial property. This, combined with a naturalistic account of content, suggests that the same spatial property can have different veridical looks. I use this to argue that a common form of representationalism about spatial experience must be rejected. I conclude by considering alternatives to this view
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Keywords | Spatial Perception, Visual Experience Perceptual Content, Representationalism Phenomenal Character |
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Reprint years | 2017 |
DOI | 10.1111/nous.12139 |
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Use Your Illusion: Spatial Functionalism, Vision Science, and the Case Against Global Skepticism.E. J. Green & Gabriel Oak Rabin - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (4):345-378.
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