Technical Artefact Theories: A Comparative Study and a New Empirical Approach

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):831-858 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Embracing an inter-disciplinary approach grounded on Gärdenfors’ theory of conceptual spaces, we introduce a formal framework to analyse and compare selected theories about technical artefacts present in the literature. Our focus is on design-oriented approaches where both designing and manufacturing activities play a crucial role. Intentional theories, like Kroes’ dual nature thesis, are able to solve disparate problems concerning artefacts but they face both the philosophical challenge of clarifying the ontological nature of intentional properties, and the empirical challenge of testing the attribution of such intentional properties to artefacts. To avoid these issues, we propose an approach that, by identifying different modalities to characterise artefact types, does not commit to intentional qualities and is able to empirically ground compliance tests.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,733

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The functional bias of the dual nature of technical artefacts program.Krist Vaesen - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (1):190-197.
Artefacts and Family Resemblance.Pawel Garbacz - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):419-447.
What is an Artefact Design?Pawel Garbacz - 2009 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 13 (2):137-149.
Pluralism on Artefact Categories: A Philosophical Defence.Wybo Houkes & Pieter E. Vermaas - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):543-557.
Coherence of structural and functional descriptions of technical artefacts.Peter Kroes - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (1):137-151.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-04-27

Downloads
68 (#307,418)

6 months
7 (#681,649)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?