Synthese:1-17 (forthcoming)

Cathy Mason
Cambridge University
Many recent philosophers have been tempted by epistemic partialism. They hold that epistemic norms and those of friendship constitutively conflict. In this paper, I suggest that underpinning this claim is the assumption that friendship is not an epistemically rich state, an assumption that even opponents of epistemic partiality have not questioned. I argue that there is good reason to question this assumption, and instead regard friendship as essentially involving knowledge of the other. If we accept this account of friendship, the possibility of epistemic partialism does not arise.
Keywords friendship  epistemic partiality  bias  epistemic norms
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-020-02892-w
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References found in this work BETA

The Sovereignty of Good.Iris Murdoch - 1970 - New York: Schocken Books.
Epistemic Partiality in Friendship.Sarah Stroud - 2006 - Ethics 116 (3):498-524.

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