Utilitas 19 (3):379-387 (2007)
In these remarks on Feldman's recent book, Pleasure and the Good Life, I concentrate on Feldman's account of pleasure as attitudinal. I argue that an account of pleasure according to which pleasure need not have any feel is implausible. I suggest that Feldman could avoid this problem but retain the advantages of his attitudinal hedonism by giving an account of the attitude such that the attitude has a feel
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The Unity and Commensurability of Pleasures and Pains.Ole Martin Moen - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (2):527-543.
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