Abstract

The purpose of the present study is to explore and defend a particular thesis within the philosophy of time, viz., that the universe does not extend in the temporal dimension as it does in the three spatial dimensions but rather has the temporal breadth of one instant. All that exists exists at present, and thus, since the present is instantaneous, all that exists exists at one and the same moment of time, the moment that we call the present. I call this view of time Presentism. Presentism, I argue, is entailed by a certain quality of our phenomenology, viz., the successiveness of our conscious states. I also show that Presentism entails a pair of controversial philosophical theses: that ours is not one among many universes but rather is the only universe, and that if a thing persists through time it is not a sum of temporal parts but rather exists identically at each moment of its history. Last I defend Presentism from a pair of objections. The first is purely philosophical, and arises from the conviction that we can speak truly of things now past. The second has its basis in physics, for the Special Theory of Relativity entails that our universe extends in the temporal dimension. To the first objection, I respond that to speak of things now past is in fact to speak of how the world-whole is at present; in response to the second, I suggest that we reject the Special Theory