An argument against motivational internalism

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt2):135-156 (2008)
Authors
Elinor Mason
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
I argue that motivational internalism should not be driving metaethics. I first show that many arguments for motivational internalism beg the question by resting on an illicit appeal to internalist assumptions about the nature of reasons. Then I make a distinction between weak internalism and the weakest form of internalism. Weak internalism allows that agents fail to act according to their normative judgments when they are practically irrational. I show that when we clarify the notion of practical irrationality it does not support motivational internalism. Weakest internalism only claims that agents are irrational if they entirely lack motivation to do what they judge they ought to. I do not argue against weakest internalism, but I argue that it is not an important view.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2008.00240.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,941
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

View all 44 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Amoralist and the Anaesthetic.Alex King - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Aristotelian Motivational Externalism.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):419-442.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Weak Inferential Internalism.David J. Alexander - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:357-377.
Internalism About a Person's Good: Don't Believe It.Alexander Sarch - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):161-184.
Aristotelian Motivational Externalism.Kristján Kristjánsson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):419-442.
Internalism and Accidie.Kent Hurtig - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (3):517 - 543.
The Indifference Argument.Nick Zangwill - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):91 - 124.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
201 ( #27,626 of 2,293,859 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #253,745 of 2,293,859 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature