What demonstrative induction can do against the threat of underdetermination: Bohr, Heisenberg, and Pauli on spectroscopic anomalies (1921–24)

Synthese 140 (3):243-277 (2004)
Michela Massimi
University of Edinburgh
In this paper I argue that demonstrative induction can deal with the problem ofthe underdetermination of theory by evidence. I present the historical case studyof spectroscopy in the early 1920s, where the choice among different theorieswas apparently underdetermined by spectroscopic evidence concerning the alkalidoublets and their anomalous Zeeman effect. By casting this historical episodewithin the methodological framework of demonstrative induction, the localunderdetermination among Bohr's, Heisenberg's, and Pauli's rival theories isresolved in favour of Pauli's theory of the electron's spin.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/B:SYNT.0000031319.64615.49
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 36,003
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Demonstrative Induction and the Skeleton of Inference.P. D. Magnus - 2008 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):303-315.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total downloads
48 ( #135,075 of 2,293,920 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #255,053 of 2,293,920 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature