Synthese 191 (8):1881-1907 (2014)

In the literature one finds two non-equivalent responses to forecasts; deference and updating. Herein it is demonstrated that, under certain conditions, both responses are entirely determined by one’s beliefs as regards the calibration of the forecaster. Further it is argued that the choice as to whether to defer to, or update on, a forecast is determined by the aim of the recipient of that forecast. If the aim of the recipient is to match their credence with the prevailing objective chances, they should defer to the forecast; if it is to maximize the veritistic value of their beliefs, they should update on the forecast
Keywords Forecast  Calibration  Deference  Updating
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-013-0384-z
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Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin Ira Goldman - 1999 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
In Defence of Objective Bayesianism.Jon Williamson - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese. pp. 263-297.
Two Mistakes Regarding the Principal Principle.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (2):407-431.
Variants of Uncertainty.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky - 1982 - Cognition 11 (2):143-157.

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