Alternative Possibilities, Volitional Necessities, and Character Setting

Disputatio 9 (45):287-307 (2017)

Authors
Benjamin Matheson
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Abstract
Conventional wisdom suggests that the power to do otherwise is necessary for being morally responsible. While much of the literature on alternative possibilities has focused on Frankfurt’s argument against this claim, I instead focus on one of Dennett’s (1984) arguments against it. This argument appeals to cases of volitional necessity rather than cases featuring counterfactual interveners. van Inwagen (1989) and Kane (1996) appeal to the notion of ‘character setting’ to argue that these cases do not show that the power to do otherwise is unnecessary for moral responsibility. In this paper, I argue that their character setting response is unsuccessful.
Keywords free will  moral responsibility  alternative possibilities  volitional necessities  character setting
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DOI 10.1515/disp-2017-0008
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References found in this work BETA

The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.
Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.

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