Acta Analytica 24 (1):69-90 (2009)

Abstract
If concepts are explicated as abstract procedures, then we can easily show that each empirical concept is a not an effective procedure. Some, but not all empirical concepts are shown to be of a special kind: they cannot in principle guarantee that the object they identify satisfies the intended conditions.
Keywords Effective procedure  Turing machine  Intensions  Constructions  Transparent intensional logic (TIL)  Concept
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s12136-008-0038-9
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,261
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Über Sinn und Bedeutung.Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1):25-50.
Introduction to Mathematical Logic.Alonzo Church - 1944 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Quality and Concept.George Bealer - 1982 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

View all 28 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Denotation and Reference.Pavel Materna - 2010 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 17 (1):3-20.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Doing Without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
The Plurality of Concepts.Daniel Aaron Weiskopf - 2009 - Synthese 169 (1):145-173.
Animal Concepts.Colin Allen - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):66-66.
Perceiving Abstract Concepts.Katja Wiemer-Hastings & Arthur C. Graesser - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):635-636.
Concepts.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Emperor’s New Concepts.Neil Tennant - 2002 - Noûs 36 (s16):345-377.
Phenomenal Concepts, Color Experience, and Mary's Puzzle.Diana I. Pérez - 2011 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):113-133.
Splitting Concepts.Gualtiero Piccinini & Sam Scott - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (4):390-409.
Introduction.Neil Tennant - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (1):1-3.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
45 ( #239,943 of 2,455,789 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #449,201 of 2,455,789 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes