Concepts and recipes

Acta Analytica 24 (1):69-90 (2009)
Abstract
If concepts are explicated as abstract procedures, then we can easily show that each empirical concept is a not an effective procedure. Some, but not all empirical concepts are shown to be of a special kind: they cannot in principle guarantee that the object they identify satisfies the intended conditions.
Keywords Effective procedure  Turing machine  Intensions  Constructions  Transparent intensional logic (TIL)  Concept
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-008-0038-9
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Quality and Concept.George Bealer - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Über Sinn und Bedeutung.Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1):25--50.

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