Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence

Episteme 6 (3):269-279 (2009)
Authors
Jonathan Matheson
University of North Florida
Abstract
Conciliatory views of disagreement maintain that discovering a particular type of disagreement requires that one make doxastic conciliation. In this paper I give a more formal characterization of such a view. After explaining and motivating this view as the correct view regarding the epistemic significance of disagreement, I proceed to defend it from several objections concerning higher-order evidence made by Thomas Kelly.
Keywords Disagreement  Conciliation  higher-order doubts or evidence
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DOI 10.3366/E1742360009000707
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Epistemic Permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.
Respecting the Evidence.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.

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Citations of this work BETA

Explanationist Evidentialism.Kevin McCain - 2013 - Episteme 10 (3):299-315.

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