Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):118-128 (2014)

Mohan Matthen
University of Toronto, Mississauga
In this review of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism, I question the adequacy of a non-representational theory of mind. I argue first that such a theory cannot differentiate cognition from other bodily engagements such as wrestling with an opponent. Second, I question whether the simple robots constructed by Rodney Brooks are adequate as models of multimodal organisms. Last, I argue that Hutto and Myin pay very little attention to how semantically interacting representations are needed to give an account of choice and action.
Keywords enactivism  intentionality  mental representation  robotic cognition  evolution of cognition  consciousness
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Reprint years 2014
DOI 10.1080/00455091.2014.905251
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References found in this work BETA

Intelligence Without Representation.Rodney A. Brooks - 1991 - Artificial Intelligence 47 (1--3):139-159.

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Representation and Mental Representation.Robert D. Rupert - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):204-225.
Enactivism and the Perception of Others’ Emotions.Søren Overgaard - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):105-129.

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Enacting is Enough.Erik Myin & Daniel D. Hutto - 2009 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 15 (1):24-30.


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