Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):139-150 (2006)

Kay Mathiesen
Northeastern University
In his paper “The Social Diffusion of Warrant and Rationality,” Sanford Goldberg argues that relying on testimony makes the warrant for our beliefs “socially diffuse” and that this diminishes our capacity to rationally police our beliefs. Thus, according to Goldberg, rationality itself is socially diffuse. I argue that while testimonial warrant may be socially diffuse (because it depends on the warrants of other epistemic agents) this feature has no special link to our capacity to rationally police our beliefs. Nevertheless, I endorse Goldberg’s claim about rationality and I propose that a Foley-style account of rationality might help to better articulate Goldberg’s proposal
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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Reprint years 2006
ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2006.tb00035.x
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Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age.Larry May - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (3):483-486.
Collective Belief And Acceptance.K. Brad Wray - 2001 - Synthese 129 (3):319-333.

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