On visual experience of objects: Comments on John Campbell's reference and consciousness

Philosophical Studies 127 (2):195-220 (2005)
Abstract
John Campbell argues that visual attention to objects is the means by which we can refer to objects, and that this is so because conscious visual attention enables us to retrieve information about a location. It is argued here that while Campbell is right to think that we visually attend to objects, he does not give us sufficient ground for thinking that consciousness is involved, and is wrong to assign an intermediary role to location. Campbell’s view on sortals is also queried, as is his espousal of the so-called Referential View of Experience.
Keywords Attention  Experience  Metaphysics  Object  Reference  Visual  Campbell, John
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Reprint years 2006
DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-4941-2
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References found in this work BETA
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
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Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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Nonconceptual Content and the "Space of Reasons".Richard Heck - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4):483-523.

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Reference, Perception, and Attention.Athanasios Raftopoulos - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):339 - 360.

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