Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):241-254 (2016)

Authors
Jennifer J. Matey
Southern Methodist University
Abstract
Phenomenal intentionality is a view about the representational content of conscious experiences that grounds the content of experiences in their phenomenal character. The view is motivated by evidence from introspection, as well as theoretical considerations and intuitions. This paper discusses one potential problem with the view. The view has difficulty accounting for the intentionality of color experiences. Versions of the view either fail to count things as part of the content of color experience that should be counted, resulting in verdicts that some color experiences are inaccurate which should not be, or they admit properties as part of their contents that ought not to be admitted, resulting in color experiences being considered to be accurate when they ought not to be considered so. This is a problem because color predicates are usefully employed in sciences such as biology, cognitive science, and engineering. They are used in generalizations that take the form of laws governing the presence and behavior of properties. Scientific practice relies on the assumption that the laws governing how entities behave employ terms that refer to actual properties that entities really have. We should therefore assume that there is some consistent set of properties to which our color terms refer.
Keywords Intentionality  Phenomenal intentionality  Perception  Color  Representation
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1111/tops.12223
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References found in this work BETA

Perception and the Fall From Eden.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125.
Inverted Earth.Ned Block - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.
Color for Philosophers.C. L. Hardin & David R. Hilbert - 1991 - Behavior and Philosophy 19 (2):83-85.

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Citations of this work BETA

Cortical Color and the Cognitive Sciences.Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia - 2017 - Topics in Cognitive Science 9 (1):135-150.

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