Personal Identity, the Causal Condition, and the Simple View

Philosophical Papers 39 (2):183-208 (2010)

Abstract

Among theories of personal identity over time the simple view has not been popular among philosophers, but it nevertheless remains the default view among non philosophers. It may be construed either as the view that nothing grounds a claim of personal identity over time, or that something quite simple (a soul perhaps) is the ground. If the former construal is accepted, a conspicuous difficulty is that the condition of causal dependence between person-stages is absent. But this leaves such a view open to an objection from the failure to provide a condition of individuation. If, on the other hand something like a soul is said to ground personal identity over time, such an account turns out to be more suited to a kind of continuity view.

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Steve Matthews
Australian Catholic University

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Wiley-Blackwell.
Principia Ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1689 - London, England: Oxford University Press.

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