Truly blue: An adverbial aspect of perceptual representation

Analysis 69 (1):48-54 (2009)
It commonly occurs that one person sees a particular colour chip B as saturated blue with no admixture of red or green (i.e., as “uniquely blue”), while another sees it as a somewhat greenish blue. Such a difference is often accompanied by agreement with respect to colour matching – the two persons may mostly agree when asked whether two chips are of the same colour, and this may be so across the whole range of colours. Asked whether B is the same or different from other chips, they mostly agree – though they continue to disagree about whether B is uniquely blue. I shall argue that in such cases neither individual misperceives what colour B is. They differ, rather, in how they perceive the colour of B.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/ann008
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References found in this work BETA
The Puzzle of True Blue.Michael Tye - 2006 - Analysis 66 (291):173–178.
Truest Blue.Alex Byrne - 2007 - Analysis 67 (293):87-92.
The Disunity of Color.Mohan P. Matthen - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):47-84.
Tye's Missing Shade of Blue.Timm Triplett - 2007 - Analysis 67 (294):166–170.

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Tye-Dyed Teleology and the Inverted Spectrum.Jason Ford - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):267-281.

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