The epistemic features of group belief

Episteme 2 (3):161-175 (2006)
Abstract
Recently, there has been a debate focusing on the question of whether groups can literally have beliefs. For the purposes of epistemology, however, the key question is whether groups can have knowledge. More specifi cally, the question is whether “group views” can have the key epistemic features of belief, viz., aiming at truth and being epistemically rational. I argue that, while groups may not have beliefs in the full sense of the word, group views can have these key epistemic features of belief. However, I argue that on Margaret Gilbert's infl uential “plural subject” account of group belief, group views are unlikely to be epistemically rational
Keywords Belief  Commitment  Epistemology  Group  Rationality  Truth  Gilbert, Margaret
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DOI 10.3366/epi.2005.2.3.161
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References found in this work BETA
Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 2000 - Westview Press.
The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman - 2000 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Values in Science: The Case of Scientific Collaboration.Kristina Rolin - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (2):157-177.
Group Justification in Science.Kristina Rolin - 2010 - Episteme 7 (3):215-231.
Collective Epistemic Goals.Don Fallis - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):267 – 280.
On the Possibility of Group Knowledge Without Belief.Raul Hakli - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):249 – 266.

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