Three-concept Monte: Explanation, implementation, and systematicity

Synthese 101 (3):347-63 (1994)
Abstract
  Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), Fodor and McLaughlin (1990) and McLaughlin (1993) challenge connectionists to explain systematicity without simply implementing a classical architecture. In this paper I argue that what makes the challenge difficult for connectionists to meet has less to do with what is to be explained than with what is to count as an explanation. Fodor et al. are prepared to admit as explanatory, accounts of a sort that only classical models can provide. If connectionists are to meet the challenge, they are going to have to insist on the propriety of changing what counts as an explanation of systematicity. Once that is done, there would seem to be as yet no reason to suppose that connectionists are unable to explain systematicity
Keywords Connectionism  Epistemology  Language  Fodor, J  Mclaughlin, B  Pylyshyn, Z
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DOI 10.1007/BF01063894
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References found in this work BETA
Recursive Distributed Representations.Jordan B. Pollack - 1990 - Artificial Intelligence 46:77-105.

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Citations of this work BETA
Systematicity Redux.Brian Mclaughlin - 2009 - Synthese 170 (2):251-274.
Can Connectionists Explain Systematicity?Robert J. Matthews - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (2):154-77.

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