The measure of mind: propositional attitudes and their attribution

New York: Oxford University Press (2007)
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Abstract

A prospective introduction -- The received view -- Troubles with the received view -- Are propositional attitudes relations? -- Foundations of a measurement-theoretic account of the attitudes -- The basic measurement-theoretic account -- Elaboration and explication of the proposed measurement-theoretic account.

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Chapters

A Prospective Introduction

This chapter discusses the emergence of a Received View, which holds that common-sense psychology has it right when it takes beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes to be the causes of behaviour. It identifies propositional attitudes with certain representational states of thei... see more

Troubles with the Received View

There are two general arguments in support of the Received View. First, it is argued that if propositional attitudes, cognitive capacities, and cognition were the sort of things (and processes) that the Received View claims they are, then that fact would explain their having the salient pr... see more

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Citations of this work

The Ethics of Conceptualization: A Needs-Based Approach.Matthieu Queloz - forthcoming - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Attitudes Towards Objects.Alex Grzankowski - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):314-328.
Not All Attitudes are Propositional.Alex Grzankowski - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy (3):374-391.
Two Methodologies for Evaluating Intellectualism.Ephraim Glick - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):398-434.

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