In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press. pp. 67--90 (2010)

Mohan Matthen
University of Toronto, Mississauga
What is the relationship between color experience and color? Here, I defend the view that it is semantic: color experience denotes color in a code innately known by the perceiver. This semantic theory contrasts with a variety of theories according to which color is defined as the cause of color experience (in a special set of circumstances). It also contrasts with primary quality theories of color, which treat color as a physical quantity. I argue that the semantic theory better accounts for the kinds of knowledge we have regarding both the color of objects that we see and of the colors themselves.
Keywords color  secondary qualities  color realism
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DOI 10.7551/mitpress/9780262013857.003.0004
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Truest Blue.A. Byrne & D. R. Hilbert - 2007 - Analysis 67 (1):87-92.

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Thinking Through Illusion.Dominic Alford‐Duguid - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):617-638.
Color Perception in Sociology.Fiona Rose-Greenland - 2016 - Sociological Theory 34 (2):81-105.

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