Philosophical Topics 33 (1):207-233 (2005)

Mohan Matthen
University of Toronto, Mississauga
Perceptual content is conceptual. In this paper, some arguments against this thesis are examined and rebutted. The Richness argument, that we could not have concepts for all the colours, is queried: Doesn't the Munsell system give us such concepts? The argument that we can perceive colours and shapes without possessing the relevant concepts is rebutted: we cannot do this, but the kind of concept-possession that is relevant here is not intellectual but perceptual
Keywords non-conceptual content  perceptual content
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0276-2080
DOI 10.5840/philtopics20053318
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Meaning.H. Paul Grice - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388.
The Contents of Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Empirical Concepts and the Content of Experience.Hannah Ginsborg - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):349-372.
Concept Empiricism, Content, and Compositionality.Collin Rice - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):567-583.
Kantian Non-Conceptualism.Robert Hanna - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64.


Added to PP index

Total views
356 ( #24,808 of 2,448,371 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #98,439 of 2,448,371 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes