Alethic Statements Are Not Intensional

According to the standard view, alethic (or modal) statements are intensional in that the Principle of Substitution (PS) fails for them -- e.g. substituting 'nine' in "Necessarily, nine is composite" with the co-referring 'the number of planets' turns this statement from true to false. It is argued in the paper that we could avoid ascribing intensionality to alethic statements altogether by separating between singular and functional uses of definite descriptions: on the singular use the description given above amounts to 'the actual number of planets', which is salva veritate substitutable to 'nine' in all alethic statements; on the functional use, in turn, that description is really a function from possible worlds to numbers, and thus the Principle of Substitution is not violated in this case either, since such a function cannot be held to be co-referential with 'nine'.
Keywords modal logic  intensionality
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,658
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Borderline Logic.David H. Sanford - 1975 - American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1):29-39.
Adequacy Conditions for Counterpart Theory.M. J. Cresswell - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):28 – 41.
Universals.George Bealer - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (1):5-32.
Three Grades of Probabilistic Involvement.Howard Smokler - 1977 - Philosophical Studies 32 (2):129 - 142.
Probability and Tempered Modal Eliminativism.Michael J. Shaffer - 2004 - History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4):305-318.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

43 ( #120,766 of 2,169,644 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #345,418 of 2,169,644 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums