Can a physicalist notion of color provide any insight into the nature of color perception?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):41-42 (2003)
Byrne & Hilbert conceive of color perception as the representation of a physical property “out there.” In our view, their approach does not only have various internal problems, but is also apt to becloud both the intricate and still poorly understood role that “ color ” plays within perceptual architecture, and the complex coupling to the “external world” of the perceptual system as an entirety. We propose an alternative perspective, which avoids B&H's misleading dichotomy between a purely subjective and a realist conception of “ color.”
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X0343001X
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Jonathan Cohen (2008). Colour Constancy as Counterfactual. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):61 – 92.

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