In Rainer Mausfeld & Dieter Heyer (eds.), Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford University Press. pp. 381--430 (2003)

Authors
Rainer Mausfeld
Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel
Abstract
The chapter argues from an ethology-inspired internalist perspective that ‘colour’ is not a homogeneous and autonomous attribute, but rather plays different roles in different conceptual forms underlying perception. It discusses empirical and theoretical evidence that indicates that core assumptions underlying orthodox conceptions are grossly inadequate. The assumptions pertain to the idea that colour is a kind of autonomous and unitary attribute. It is regarded as unitary or homogeneous by assuming that its core properties do not depend on the type of ‘perceptual object’ to which it pertains and that‘colour per se’ constitutes a natural attribute in the functional architecture of the perceptual system. It is regarded as autonomous by assuming that it can be studied in isolation of other perceptual attributes. More generally, the chapter argues on the bases of corresponding empirical and theoretical evidence that perception cannot be understood as the ‘recovery’ of physical world structure from sensory structure by input-based computational processes. Rather, the sensory input serves as a kind of sign for biologically relevant aspects of the external world that activates biologically given conceptual forms with their internal parameters. Although the sensory input is a causally necessary requirement for the activation of conceptual forms, the perceptual computations triggered are under the control of an internal programme based on a set of conceptual forms.
Keywords colour coding  internal semantics  competing conjoint representations
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy the book Find it on Amazon.com
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Principles of Gestalt Psychology.Oliver L. Reiser - 1936 - Philosophical Review 45 (4):412-415.
Ways of Coloring.Evan Thompson, A. Palacios & F. J. Varela - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):1-26.

View all 31 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Color Realism and Color Science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
Colour Constancy as Counterfactual.Jonathan Cohen - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):61 – 92.
Inter-Species Variation in Colour Perception.Keith Allen - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):197 - 220.
Revelation and the Nature of Colour.Keith Allen - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (2):153-176.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Colour Irrealism and the Formation of Colour Concepts.Jonathan Ellis - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):53-73.
On the Dual Referent Approach to Colour Theory.Derek H. Brown - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):96-113.
Can the Physicalist Explain Colour Structure in Terms of Colour Experience?1.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):535 – 564.
The 4th Dimension. Wittgenstein on Colour and Imagination.Tine Wilde - 2002 - In Christian Kanzian, Josef Quitterer & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Persons. An Interdisciplinary Approach. Papers of the 25th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 284-286.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
387 ( #19,945 of 2,419,994 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
20 ( #38,099 of 2,419,994 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes