Hommage À Wlodek (2007)
In this paper I argue that the infinite regress of resemblance is vicious in the guise it is given by Russell but that it is virtuous if generated in a (contemporary) trope theoretical framework. To explain why this is so I investigate the infinite regress argument. I find that there is but one interesting and substantial way in which the distinction between vicious and virtuous regresses can be understood: The Dependence Understanding. I argue, furthermore, that to be able to decide whether an infinite regress exhibits a dependence pattern of a vicious or a virtuous kind, facts about the theoretical context in which it is generated become essential. It is precisely because of differences in context that he Russellian resemblance regress is vicious whereas its trope theoretical counterpart is not.
|Keywords||Infinite regress Dependence Explanation Bradley regress Resembance regress|
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Relata-Specific Relations: A Response to Vallicella.Jan Willem Wieland & Arianna Betti - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):509-524.
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