David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ratio Juris 23 (3):411-427 (2010)
This paper discusses the place of philosophical naturalism in the philosophy of law, with special reference to Scandinavian Realism. Hägerström originated a non-cognitivist analysis of certain fundamental legal concepts, but he also proposed an error theory. The two approaches are incompatible, but were not always clearly distinguished. Among his followers, Olivecrona and Ross gradually abandoned the latter, at least from the late 1940s. Many accounts of their views are unclear, because the presence of these two kinds of analysis, their incompatibility, and the gradual abandonment of one, has often been overlooked. A corollary of the discussion is that there are some important corrigenda in the entry “Naturalism in legal philosophy” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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References found in this work BETA
G. E. Moore (1903). Principia Ethica. Dover Publications.
Mark Timmons (1998). Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism. Oxford University Press.
Alf Ross (1968). Directives and Norms. Lawbook Exchange.
Citations of this work BETA
Torben Spaak (2015). Realism About the Nature of Law. Ratio Juris 29 (4).
Dan Jerker B. Svantesson (2013). What Is “Law,” If “the Law” Is Not Something That “Is”? A Modest Contribution to a Major Question. Ratio Juris 26 (3):456-485.
Jakob V. H. Holtermann (2015). Getting Real or Staying Positive: Legal Realism, Legal Positivism and the Prospects of Naturalism in Jurisprudence. Ratio Juris 28 (1):535-555.
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