Induction and scientific realism: Einstein versus Van Fraassen: Part two: Aim-oriented empiricism and scientific essentialism

Nicholas Maxwell
University College London
In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism provides decisive grounds for accepting scientific realism and rejecting instrumentalism. But it goes further than this. Aim-oriented empiricism implies that physicalism is a central part of current (conjectural) scientific knowledge. Furthermore, we can and need, I argue, to interpret fundamental physical theories as attributing necessitating physical properties to fundamental physical entities.
Keywords Scientific realism  Physicalism  Conjectural physical essentialism
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/44.1.81
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