Induction and scientific realism: Einstein versus Van Fraassen: Part two: Aim-oriented empiricism and scientific essentialism

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):81-101 (1993)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism provides decisive grounds for accepting scientific realism and rejecting instrumentalism. But it goes further than this. Aim-oriented empiricism implies that physicalism is a central part of current (conjectural) scientific knowledge. Furthermore, we can and need, I argue, to interpret fundamental physical theories as attributing necessitating physical properties to fundamental physical entities.

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Part two: Aim-oriented empiricism and scientific essentialism.Nicholas Maxwell - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):81-101.
Muller’s Critique of the Argument for Aim-Oriented Empiricism.Nicholas Maxwell - 2009 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (1):103-114.

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Nicholas Maxwell
University College London

Citations of this work

Erkenntnistheoretische und ontologische probleme der theoretischen begriffe.Marco Buzzoni - 1997 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 28 (1):19-53.

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References found in this work

The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
Laws and Symmetry.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1989 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 182 (3):327-329.
Popper’s qualitative theory of verisimilitude.David Miller - 1974 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):166-177.
The ontological status of theoretical entities.Grover Maxwell - 1962 - In Herbert Feigl & Grover Maxwell (eds.), Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Minneapolis, MN, USA: University of Minnesota Press. pp. 181-192.
Can there be necessary connections between successive events?Nicholas Maxwell - 1968 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (1):1-25.

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