Muller's critique of the argument for aim-oriented empiricism

For over 30 years I have argued that we need to construe science as accepting a metaphysical proposition concerning the comprehensibility of the universe. In a recent paper, Fred Muller criticizes this argument, and its implication that Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism is untenable. In the present paper I argue that Muller’s criticisms are not valid. The issue is of some importance, for my argument that science accepts a metaphysical proposition is the first step in a broader argument intended to demonstrate that we need to bring about a revolution in science, and ultimately in academic inquiry as a whole so that the basic aim becomes wisdom and not just knowledge.
Keywords Standard empiricism  Constructive empiricism  Aim-oriented empiricism  Metaphysics  ad hoc theories  Scientific realism  F. A. Muller  B. C. van Fraassen
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DOI 10.1007/s10838-009-9081-5
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Is Science Neurotic?Nicholas Maxwell - 2004 - Imperial College Press.
Is Science Neurotic?Nicholas Maxwell - 2002 - Metaphilosophy 33 (3):259-299.

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