Philosophy of Science 29 (2):132-138 (1962)
AbstractUtilizing Carnap's notions of "questions [or assertions] within a framework" and "questions [or assertions] about a framework" and his account of A-truth (analyticity in the broad sense), a theory of the ontological status of entities--in particular, that of theoretical entities--is adumbrated. In addition to the usual L-rules, each conceptual framework considered embodies a set of sentences whose truth value is quickly decidable on other than purely linguistic grounds, a set of A-true formulae, and a set of rules for the confirmation and disconfirmation of non-L-true, non-A-true formulae which are not quickly decidable. Criteria which acceptable sets of A-true formulae must fulfill are given. Using this apparatus, a schema for a realistic interpretation of scientific theories is outlined
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Citations of this work
Carnap, the Ramsey-Sentence and Realistic Empiricism.Stathis Psillos - 2000 - Erkenntnis 52 (2):253-279.
Craig's Theorem, Ramsey-Sentences, and Scientific Instrumentalism.James W. Cornman - 1972 - Synthese 25 (1-2):82 - 128.
How to Be a Scientific Realist (If at All): A Study of Partial Realism.Dean Peters - 2012 - Dissertation, London School of Economics
I. Are 'External Questions' Non‐Cognitive?E. D. Klemke - 1970 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 13 (1-4):289-297.
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