Theories, frameworks, and ontology

Philosophy of Science 29 (2):132-138 (1962)

Abstract

Utilizing Carnap's notions of "questions [or assertions] within a framework" and "questions [or assertions] about a framework" and his account of A-truth (analyticity in the broad sense), a theory of the ontological status of entities--in particular, that of theoretical entities--is adumbrated. In addition to the usual L-rules, each conceptual framework considered embodies a set of sentences whose truth value is quickly decidable on other than purely linguistic grounds, a set of A-true formulae, and a set of rules for the confirmation and disconfirmation of non-L-true, non-A-true formulae which are not quickly decidable. Criteria which acceptable sets of A-true formulae must fulfill are given. Using this apparatus, a schema for a realistic interpretation of scientific theories is outlined

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Constructs and Fictions.David Gruender - 1968 - Dialectica 22 (1):20-27.
I. Are 'External Questions' Non‐Cognitive?E. D. Klemke - 1970 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 13 (1-4):289-297.

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