What’s Wrong With Aim-Oriented Empiricism?

Abstract
For four decades it has been argued that we need to adopt a new conception of science called aim-oriented empiricism. This has far-reaching implications and repercussions for science, the philosophy of science, academic inquiry in general, conception of rationality, and how we go about attempting to make progress towards as good a world as possible. Despite these far-reaching repercussions, aim-oriented empiricism has so far received scant attention from philosophers of science. Here, sixteen objections to the validity of the argument for aim-oriented empiricism are subjected to critical scrutiny.
Keywords Philosophy of science  Metaphysical assumptions of science  Physicalism  Scientific method  Scientific progress  Natural philosophy  Social inquiry and humanities  Wisdom-inquiry
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