Did Pearson reject the Neyman-Pearson philosophy of statistics?

Synthese 90 (2):233 - 262 (1992)
Abstract
I document some of the main evidence showing that E. S. Pearson rejected the key features of the behavioral-decision philosophy that became associated with the Neyman-Pearson Theory of statistics (NPT). I argue that NPT principles arose not out of behavioral aims, where the concern is solely with behaving correctly sufficiently often in some long run, but out of the epistemological aim of learning about causes of experimental results (e.g., distinguishing genuine from spurious effects). The view Pearson did hold gives a deeper understanding of NPT tests than their typical formulation as accept-reject routines, against which criticisms of NPT are really directed. The Pearsonian view that emerges suggests how NPT tests may avoid these criticisms while still retaining what is central to these methods: the control of error probabilities.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00485352
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,590
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Likelihood.A. W. F. Edwards - 1972 - Cambridge University Press.
Novel Evidence and Severe Tests.Deborah G. Mayo - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (4):523-552.
Inference, Method and Decision.David Miller & Roger D. Rosenkrantz - 1980 - Philosophical Quarterly 30 (120):264.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Strategies for Securing Evidence Through Model Criticism.Kent Staley - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):21-43.
A New Proof of the Likelihood Principle.Greg Gandenberger - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):475-503.
Civilization and Its Discounts.Philip Mirowski - 1995 - Dialogue 34 (03):541-.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
On the Neyman-Pearson Theory of Testing.Spencer Graves - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (1):1-23.
Severe Testing as a Basic Concept in a Neyman–Pearson Philosophy of Induction.Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):323-357.
Novel Evidence and Severe Tests.Deborah G. Mayo - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (4):523-552.
Models and Statistical Inference: The Controversy Between Fisher and Neyman–Pearson.Johannes Lenhard - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):69-91.
Of Nulls and Norms.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:280 - 290.
On After-Trial Criticisms of Neyman-Pearson Theory of Statistics.Deborah G. Mayo - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:145 - 158.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

99 ( #51,266 of 2,168,526 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #346,757 of 2,168,526 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums