Synthese 90 (2):233 - 262 (1992)
I document some of the main evidence showing that E. S. Pearson rejected the key features of the behavioral-decision philosophy that became associated with the Neyman-Pearson Theory of statistics (NPT). I argue that NPT principles arose not out of behavioral aims, where the concern is solely with behaving correctly sufficiently often in some long run, but out of the epistemological aim of learning about causes of experimental results (e.g., distinguishing genuine from spurious effects). The view Pearson did hold gives a deeper understanding of NPT tests than their typical formulation as accept-reject routines, against which criticisms of NPT are really directed. The Pearsonian view that emerges suggests how NPT tests may avoid these criticisms while still retaining what is central to these methods: the control of error probabilities.
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References found in this work BETA
The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance.Isaac Levi - 1980 - MIT Press.
Inference, Method and Decision.David Miller & Roger D. Rosenkrantz - 1980 - Philosophical Quarterly 30 (120):264.
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A Visible Hand in the Marketplace of Ideas: Precision Measurement as Arbitage.Philip Mirowski - 1994 - Science in Context 7 (3).
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