Notes on Frege on rules of inference
1. There is only one rule of inference, modus ponens. This is true both in the presentations of Begriffsschrift and Grundgesetze. There are other ways of making transitions between propositions in proofs, but these are never labeled by Frege “rules of inference.” These pertain to scope of quantification, parsing of formulas, introduction of definitions, conventions for the use and replacement of the various letters, and certain structural reorganizations, ; cf. the list in Gg §48
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