Jeffrey Maynes
St. Lawrence University
Prominent critics and champions of Experimental Philosophy (X-Phi) alike have tied its philosophical significance to the philosophical significance of intuition. In this essay, I develop an interpretation of X-Phi which does not require an intuition-driven understanding of traditional philosophy, and the arguments challenged by results in X-Phi. X-Phi's role on this account is primarily dialectical. Its aim is to test the universality of claims which are merely assumed to be true, exploring the limits of our assumptions and showing when a proposition is more controversial than is widely believed.
Keywords experimental philosophy  philosophical methodology  intuition
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References found in this work BETA

Animal Liberation.Peter Singer (ed.) - 1977 - Avon Books.
Philosophy Without Intuitions.Herman Cappelen - 2012 - Oxford University Press UK.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Method(s) of Cases.Jeffrey Maynes - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (1):102-124.

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