On the very concept of free will

Synthese 191 (12):2849-2866 (2014)
Abstract
Determinism seems to rule out a robust sense of options but also prevent our choices from being a matter of luck. In this way, free will seems to require both the truth and falsity of determinism. If the concept of free will is coherent, something must have gone wrong. I offer a diagnosis on which this puzzle is due at least in part to a tension already present in the very idea of free will. I provide various lines of support for this hypothesis, including some experimental data gathered by probing the judgments of non-specialists
Keywords Freedom  Moral responsibility  Experimental philosophy   Incompatibilism  Compatibilism  Cluster concept  Prototype
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0426-1
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References found in this work BETA
Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.

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Citations of this work BETA
Why People Believe in Indeterminist Free Will.Oisín Deery - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2033-2054.

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