On the very concept of free will

Synthese 191 (12):2849-2866 (2014)

Authors
Joshua May
University of Alabama, Birmingham
Abstract
Determinism seems to rule out a robust sense of options but also prevent our choices from being a matter of luck. In this way, free will seems to require both the truth and falsity of determinism. If the concept of free will is coherent, something must have gone wrong. I offer a diagnosis on which this puzzle is due at least in part to a tension already present in the very idea of free will. I provide various lines of support for this hypothesis, including some experimental data gathered by probing the judgments of non-specialists
Keywords Freedom  Moral responsibility  Experimental philosophy   Incompatibilism  Compatibilism  Cluster concept  Prototype
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0426-1
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References found in this work BETA

Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
Verbal Disputes.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):515-566.
Free Will and Luck: Reply to Critics.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.

View all 34 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind.Joshua May - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
In the Thick of Moral Motivation.Wesley Buckwalter & John Turri - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):433-453.
Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cognition.John Turri - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (S3):403-424.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

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